INTRODUCTION
Health warnings on cigarette packages are among the most direct means of communicating smoking's health risks. Research indicates that they can discourage youth smoking initiation, encourage smoking cessation, and disrupt brand imagery by restricting available package space. [1, 2] However, their impact is determined by their design, positioning, and size: with larger warnings both improving recall and shaping risk magnitude perceptions. [2, 3] Additionally, there is debate about which information should be offered for the warnings to be effective. [4, 5] Products Directive (TPD). Cigarette packages were required to contain a warning label with one of two general warning texts covering 30% of the front of the package and a warning label with one of 14 different texts covering 40% of the back of the package. [6] The Directive included a provision stating that the warnings should be "surrounded by a black border not less than 3 mm and not more than 4 mm in width which in no way interferes with the text of the warning or information given". [6] Despite the appearance of precision, this guidance permitted two different interpretations, with the border either being included in or excluded from the prescribed surface percentages. In practice, 15
Member States, including the Netherlands, interpreted the provision to mean that a 3 mm border should be included in the surface percentages, making the text warnings smaller than if the border had been excluded (see Figure 1 ). [7] However, in the first report on the application of the TPD, the Commission stated that the black border should not be counted as part of the warning area. [8] This paper examines how corporate actors shaped this process and builds on two separate bodies of knowledge: research on the implementation of EU legislation, which has typically studied how public and elected officials at the national level have influenced the way EU directives are implemented in national legislation, [9, 10] and studies of tobacco industry political activity aimed at shaping labelling legislation [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . This study analyses industry political activity during the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 twice "within months", VNK proposed to "combine the adjustments to the Labelling Decree" with those required by the TPD. [26] Emphasising that this would limit compliance costs, VNK described how the industry had already made preparations to incorporate the TPD's labelling requirements and that requiring other labels would lead to considerable costs, which had not been properly considered, since research into the business impacts was lacking. [26] In a On 17 th July 2001 the adjusted Draft Labelling Decree for tobacco products was published.
The black border provision was a translation of the EU TPD provision, with no mention of whether the border should be included in or excluded from the warning space. Additionally, it stated that tobacco manufacturers had already begun to develop a proposal for the warning labels' technical specifications. [30] Deliberations on the placement of the black border began on 20 th July when the Health Ministry indicated that it should not be part of the warnings' prescribed surface percentage, as described in a 27 th July letter from SSI to the Health Ministry. [29] In that letter SSI stated that in their preparations tobacco manufacturers had assumed that the borders were to be included in the surface area and that the negotiated date (1 st March and 1 st May for all but a minority of packages) stated that from these definitive amendments it would have become clear that the government "for the time being" did not require the black border to be excluded from the prescribed surface percentages. [38] This would remain unchanged until the present day.
Health Ministry perspective
During The fact that the Netherlands would be first to implement the new warning labels was a source of "pride", since the Netherlands was usually "rather slow" in these matters. (Interview policy officer 1)
On the topic of the black borders, it was said that at the time "we personally did not find it that important. We believed that the text of the warnings was more important." (Interview policy officer 1) Tobacco industry lobbying surrounding the introduction of the new health warnings -by letter, telephone, email and meetings -was characterised as "extremely proactive" and like "having to keep the flies away." (Interview policy officer 1) One policy officer's strategy was always to "meet as little as possible". However, whilst officers considered that they "did not need [industry] information", meetings were sometimes required from "higher authorities" to avoid accusations of not being prepared to consult and to comply with minimal requirements of stakeholder consultation. 
Tobacco industry perspective
When interviewed, SSI and VNK representatives highlighted the importance of avoiding needless costs "[since] millions are involved in the adjustment of packaging". Communication with the government on the black border was said to be driven by this concern and not "protection of When asked about communications between the tobacco manufacturers' associations and the Health Ministry, SSI and VNK representatives mentioned that "the pace of the industry and the government is different", since "the industry always wants to know as quickly as possible how something needs to be implemented". It was also emphasised that dialogue on technical details of implementation benefits both industry and the government. On the one hand, companies need clear information on how measures should be implemented to avoid litigation risks. On the other hand, dialogue supports policy makers, since they are not always aware of the practical issues involved.
Industry actors saw it as their "role" to "relate practice to the Health Ministry" and, therefore, that it was important that the industry "arrives at acceptable implementation of legislation together with the government". Industry representatives emphasised that in respect to "technical aspects of implementation", the Health Ministry's view was that dialogue with industry actors remained necessary despite the subsequent introduction of working practices consistent with FCTC Article 5.3.
(Interview vice chair SSI and current chair VNK) Finally, industry actors emphasised the greater costs involved when legislation was implemented differently across EU Member States: "the more uniformity, the less divergent packaging material, the less machine changeover time, the less costs".
(Interview vice chair SSI and current chair VNK)
DISCUSSION
The present study illustrates how in the Netherlands the tobacco industry was able to reduce the size of health warnings by successfully exploiting uncertainty over an ambiguous implementation provision in the EU TPD's labelling section. More generally, the findings highlight the policy risks associated with government-industry interactions during the implementation phase of the policy process and the potential for deliberations over what seem like minor technical specifications to have far-reaching health policy consequences. [43, 44] During the TPD implementation phase, the Dutch government gave tobacco manufacturers' associations a legitimate status as "political insiders" [45, 46] . Providing industry access to policymakers is often an unavoidable part of implementing health measures that require changes to product specifications, a process which is difficult to manage through legal instruments alone. This point is underlined by FCTC's Recommendation 2.1 of the Guidelines for Implementation for Article 5.3, which specifies that Parties should interact with the tobacco industry "only when and to the extent strictly necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and tobacco products." [44] The risks of such interactions are intensified by the fact that the practical implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers.
Our findings indicate that contrary to what industry actors claimed in interview, corporate political activity is an ongoing practice that continues after legislation has been passed. As Parties to the FCTC introduce restrictions on industry lobbying, this phase is likely to become an increasingly important administrative milieu for corporate political influence, carrying distinctive risks for policy formation due to the co-operative dynamic that may emerge. Our findings thus underline the value of prescriptive detail in EU tobacco directives, which reduce the scope for negotiation and contestation by the industry. In contrast to the TPD border provision, other aspects of the labelling section with more precise technical specifications (e.g. on the font and the position of the text within the warning labels), were consistently implemented across EU Member States. Although the supranational nature of the EU creates practical obstacles in drafting prescriptive detail, the certainty provided by this is likely to work for both tobacco manufacturers -who emphasised the cost advantages of legislative precision -and public health.
Additionally, our results support the findings of existing research which underlines how
Better Regulation practices are likely to create opportunities for industry lobbying [47, 48] . Our findings indicate that estimating cost impacts via impact assessments -a key characteristic of Better 
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